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To what extent does downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) raise the unemployment
rate during periods of low inflation or deflation? To answer this question, we simulate the
impact on the male unemployment rate in Japan, by incorporating the DNWR of full-
time male employees as estimated by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) into the general
equilibrium model of Akerlof et al. (1996). The simulation results show the following.
First, the DNWR estimated by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) with Japanese longitudi-
nal data from 1993–98 has a minor impact on the unemployment rate compared with
the case of perfect DNWR. Nevertheless, this impact is not trivial in the sense that it raises
the unemployment rate by as much as 1.8 percentage points under the baseline parameters
adopted in this paper. Second, regarding the relationship with the rate of inflation,
DNWR does not cause unemployment as long as the inflation rate is approximately 
2.4 percent or higher, whereas its effects tend to increase gradually as the inflation rate
falls below 2.4 percent. When inflation is below approximately 1 percent, however, the 
marginal increase in unemployment attributable to DNWR is small since DNWR is
moderated by the adjustments to bonuses and extensive wage cuts observed in our Japanese
data sets. Instead, under these conditions, it is the additional unemployment brought by
labor market distortions that becomes the issue.
Keywords: Downward nominal wage rigidity; Unemployment rate; Inflation rate;
Monetary policy; General equilibrium model with downward nominal
wage rigidity
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DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION.I. Introduction
Throughout the postwar period until the early 1990s, Japan’s unemployment rate
had been maintained at extremely low levels of around 1 to 2 percent. After the 
bubble economy burst at the start of the 1990s, however, the unemployment rate
began to climb. It rose to the 3 percent level in 1995, then the 4 percent level in
1998, and has remained mired in the 5 percent range from the 2000s.
What can explain this persistent increase in unemployment? If the labor market’s
price adjustment mechanism is functioning, unemployment caused by insufficient
effective demand should be eliminated through declines in the real wage. Using
Japanese longitudinal data from 1993–98, however, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, b)
confirmed that Japanese nominal wages are downwardly rigid to some extent. Under
low inflation or deflation, therefore, one may conclude that downward 
nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) has damaged the labor market’s price adjustment
mechanism. If the sustained rise in the unemployment rate is attributed to DNWR,
managing monetary policy by targeting a small but positive, rather than zero, 
inflation rate could create further room for real wage adjustments, which help 
reduce unemployment.
However, even if the existence of DNWR is confirmed, it would not be powerful
enough to support monetary policy targeting a small but positive inflation, unless 
the actual impact of downward rigidity on unemployment is considered nontrivial.
1
In this regard, there has been a wealth of research quantifying the extent to which
DNWR has caused unemployment, with the pioneering paper being Akerlof et al.
(1996). Taking account of DNWR, Akerlof et al. (1996) suggest that a reduction in
the inflation rate from 3 to zero percent would boost the unemployment rate from
5.8 to 7.6 percent, and that 1 percent deflation would raise the unemployment rate
to as high as 10.0 percent. The results of their paper are frequently cited in research
arguing that the optimal rate of inflation should be small but positive rather than
zero (see, for example, Fortin [1996], Bernanke et al. [1999], and Svensson [1999]).
2
Furthermore, Lebow et al. (1999) estimate the Phillips curve using a parameter 
indicating DNWR, and find that the decline in the inflation rate in the 1990s caused
an increase in the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) in 
the United States. Meanwhile, Card and Hyslop (1997) use regional data to verify
whether the slope of the Phillips curve differs between periods of high inflation and 
low inflation, and find no clear difference between the two. Fares and Hogan (2000)
and Faruqui (2000) use data from Canada to estimate an employment adjustment
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1. Since the 1990s, there have been numerous empirical studies addressing the question of whether nominal wages
are downwardly rigid. This research seems to have reached a consensus that DNWR does exist to some extent in
Europe and the United States. Such research includes McLaughlin (1994, 1999, 2000), Lebow et al. (1995), Kahn
(1997), Card and Hyslop (1997), and Altonji and Devereux (1999). The existence of DNWR has also been 
confirmed in Japan by Kimura and Ueda (2001) and Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, b). Although Kimura and
Ueda (2001) acknowledge DNWR until around 1998, they find no such rigidity when they extend the data until
the first quarter of 2000. Furthermore, as described later, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, b) find that under 
conditions requiring large wage cuts, it is in fact possible to lower nominal wages.
2. In addition to DNWR, other factors supporting a small but positive rather than zero inflation rate include the impact
on the financial system from debt deflation, the reduced effectiveness of monetary policy under the zero bound 
constraint on nominal interest rates, and the upward bias to price indices. For further details, see Shiratsuka (2001).function incorporating an index of DNWR. They find that DNWR has no significant
impact on employment adjustments if they control for relevant shocks.
3
In Japan, however, there has been virtually no analysis addressing this issue.
Referring to the framework by Akerlof et al. (1996), therefore, this paper analyzes the
impact on unemployment from DNWR confirmed by Kuroda and Yamamoto
(2003b). We conduct Monte Carlo simulations on a general equilibrium model,
focusing on the DNWR of full-time male employees and the male unemployment
rate.
4 The degree of DNWR is incorporated as “the extent to which nominal wage
cuts are deferred (despite the fact that notional nominal wages should decline).” By
altering the degree of DNWR and the inflation rate, we confirm the changes in the
simulated employee-based unemployment rate.
5
We also show that in addition to DNWR there are other labor market distortions
in the model of Akerlof et al. (1996), and these also cause unemployment. That is, in
their model, the bargaining power of employees, the value of workers’ time while unem-
ployed, and wage inertia are incorporated as factors that could raise the steady-state
level of nominal wages above the market clearing level even in the absence of DNWR.
We therefore distinguish between the effects of DNWR and those of other labor 
market distortions, and focus on the extent to which increases in the unemployment
rate brought by declines in the inflation rate can be attributed to DNWR.
A preliminary summary of our simulation results is as follows. First, compared with
the case of perfect downward rigidity, the DNWR estimated by Kuroda and Yamamoto
(2003b) using longitudinal data from 1993–98 has only a minor impact on unemploy-
ment. Second, this impact is nonetheless nontrivial as it could raise the unemployment
rate by as much as 1.8 percentage points. Third, as for the relation with the inflation rate,
DNWR leads to unemployment when the inflation rate is roughly 2.4 percent or lower.
On the other hand, if the inflation rate drops below approximately 1 percent or turns into
deflation, there is no additional unemployment caused by DNWR, but rather it is labor
market distortions that lead to additional unemployment.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review prior research analyzing
the impact of DNWR on employment. We also explain briefly the findings of Kuroda
and Yamamoto (2003b) that estimate the extent of downward rigidity in nominal
wages via model estimation. In Section III, we provide an overview of a general 
equilibrium model incorporating DNWR and explain the simulation procedures used.
In Section IV, we describe the simulation results. In Section V, we look at the policy
implications suggested by our findings and describe additional issues for discussion. 
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3. The majority of prior research examining the relationship between DNWR and employment focuses on labor
demand, but Altonji and Devereux (1999) focus on the impact on the labor supply. Kuroda and Yamamoto
(2003c) also analyze whether workers leave their jobs less often if nominal wage cuts that should have occurred are
deferred due to DNWR.
4. In this paper, we only analyze DNWR of full-time male employees, and do not account for other types of 
workers such as full-time female employees or part-time workers. It would be preferable to define specific labor 
supply-demand functions for these different groups to consider different degrees of nominal wage rigidity and the
substitution relationship between groups. Taking this into account would complicate the model, however, and
greatly expand the amount of time required for simulation.
5. Since our model does not account for self-employed or those employed in family businesses, we use the employee-
based unemployment rate, which is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed by the sum of employed
and unemployed persons. This will be abbreviated to “unemployment rate” for the remainder of the paper.II. DNWR in Japan
We incorporate the degree of DNWR estimated by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b)
into the model from Akerlof et al. (1996). This warrants a brief overview of Kuroda
and Yamamoto (2003b), as follows.
Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) use Japanese longitudinal data from the 1993–98
waves of the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC) conducted by the Institute 
for Research on Household Economics (IRHE) to estimate the friction model 
shown below.
wi
* − w ∼
i,−1 if 0 < wi
* − w ∼
i,−1, 
w ∼
i − w ∼
i,−1 = 0 if  −  < wi
* − w ∼
i,−1 ≤ 0, (1)
 wi
* − w ∼
i,−1 +   if          wi
* − w ∼
i,−1 ≤−  , 
where w ∼
i,−1 is the log of nominal wage in the previous period and w ∼
i is the log of
nominal wage in the current period for each individual (i = 1, . . . , n). wi
* is the 
log of the notional wage expressed as a function of individual characteristics and a
normally distributed error term. The model assumes that the observed nominal 
wage change can differ from the notional wage change when the notional wage
change is less than zero. Specifically, if the notional wage change is between a certain
negative threshold value and zero, the nominal wage change becomes zero, but under
conditions where the notional wage change falls below this threshold value, the
model allows a nominal wage cut to occur.
Parameter   is the threshold value that determines the range under which the
observed nominal wage change is held to zero. If the estimated parameter   is signifi-
cantly positive, nominal wage cuts do not occur as long as the notional wage change
ranges from −(  × 100) to zero percent. That is, there exists DNWR. Parameter  
determines the extent to which the nominal wage cut diverges from the notional
wage cut when notional wage change falls below the threshold value. If the estimated
parameter   is significantly positive, it implies that the observed negative nominal
wage change rates are still (  × 100) percent higher than the notional ones, even
when the notional wage change falls below the threshold. On the other hand, if   is
estimated negative, it is understood that nominal wage cuts are conducted by more
than the amount that would be expected based on the notional wage. 
The results from this friction model estimated by Kuroda and Yamamoto 
(2003b) are summarized in Figure 1. The horizontal axis in Figure 1 is the notional
wage change, the vertical axis is the observed nominal wage change, and the 
45-degree line indicates where the two are equal. When the notional wage change 
is positive, the notional and observed nominal wage changes are assumed to be 
equal. When the notional wage change is zero or less, however, the observed nominal
wage change is zero, thereby deviating from the 45-degree line and becoming 
horizontal. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) estimate friction models for several 
types of wages, by employment status and sex. Among the results, we look here 
only at the results concerned with the regular wages (regular monthly wages) and
60 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 2003annual earnings (total of regular wages, bonus, and overtime pay for the full year) of 
full-time male employees.
6
As shown in Figure 1, the regular wages of full-time male employees are not actually
reduced as long as the changes in notional wages do not drop below –7.7 percent. 
In other words, regular wages have downward rigidity within the –7.7 to zero percent
range. Nevertheless, when the notional wage changes drop below the threshold value
of –7.7 percent, the reductions tend to be substantially larger than those indicated by
the decline in the notional wage changes since  is estimated to be negative. Downward
rigidity in annual earnings, on the other hand, exists when the notional change is in the
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[1] Regular Monthly Salaries of Full-Time Male Employees
[2] Annual Earnings of Full-Time Male Employees
Source: Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b), taking account of measurement errors.
6. Figure 1 shows the results of Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) using a model that statistically takes into account
measurement errors in reported nominal wages.range from –3.5 to zero percent, and when it drops below this range, actual annual
earnings are reduced further than the notional wage change, just as with regular wages.
The smaller threshold value for annual earnings relative to regular wages is consistent
with prior research by Suruga (1987) and others who find that bonuses serve to increase
the flexibility of nominal wages in Japan.
In the next section, we introduce a general equilibrium model that incorporates the
DNWR derived from Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b). As for measures of DNWR, we
apply the estimates for   and   for the regular wages and annual earnings of full-time
male employees in the friction model.
III. General Equilibrium Model Incorporating DNWR
A. General Equilibrium Model and Japan’s Labor Market
In this section, we explain the general equilibrium model and simulation procedures
used for our analysis. The framework revolves around the model in Akerlof et al.
(1996), hereafter the ADP model. We modify the model to reflect the characteristics
of Japan’s labor market.
1. The general equilibrium model from Akerlof et al. (1996) 
The ADP model assumes a market structure with monopolistic competition in which
each firm is faced with two types of heterogeneous shocks, one in the demand for
their goods and the other in the real wages. Based on the assumption of monopolistic
competition, the price of each firm’s product is determined as a markup over the
nominal cost of labor input (nominal wage), which is the only production input. The
following assumptions are made regarding the setting of nominal wages. First, nomi-
nal wages, which are determined through bargaining between the employees and the
firm, are consistently higher than the market clearing level. This is because of the
employees’ bargaining power and positive value of time while unemployed, and the
slow adjustment of real and nominal wages from the previous period. Furthermore,
to reflect DNWR, nominal wages are not reduced by more than 1 percent, except in
the case of firms with two consecutive periods of losses.
The feature of slow adjustments to nominal wages can also be derived by 
incorporating staggered wage adjustments of the type described in Taylor (1979,
1980) or Calvo (1983). Accordingly, the ADP model can be interpreted as a general 
equilibrium model incorporating staggered wage adjustments with the additional
constraint of DNWR.
2. Modification of the ADP model
To take into account the characteristics of Japan’s labor market, we make the 
following two modifications to the ADP model. First, we incorporate partial 
downward rigidity in nominal wages to allow for nominal wage cuts once the
notional wage changes drop below a negative threshold. Second, we distinguish
between regular wages and bonuses.
These modifications are motivated by the results of Kuroda and Yamamoto
(2003b). As explained in the previous section, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) show
that Japan’s DNWR is imperfect in the sense that large cuts in nominal wages can
62 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 2003occur. Also, according to Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b), annual earnings including
bonuses are less downwardly rigid than regular wages. These modifications are an
attempt to reflect these characteristics of Japan’s wage structure.
B. Model Description 
1. Goods market
In the goods market, we assume that monopolistically competitive firms indexed by
i(i = 1, . . . , n) face the following product demand function, consisting of aggregate
demand and the demand for the individual firms’ products.
MP i
− 
Di = (—)(—) e
 i/n, (2)
P – P –
where Di is product demand, Pi is the price charged by each monopolistically 
competitive firm, P – is the aggregate price level (P – = n
−1 
n
i=1Pi), M is the money 
supply,   is the price elasticity of product demand, and  i is the heterogeneous shock
to product demand, which follows an AR (1) process as shown in equation (3). 
 i =    i,−1 +  i
 ,   i
  ∼ N(0,   
2), (3)
where    is the autocorrelation coefficient and  i
  is the normally distributed disturb-
ance with mean zero and variance   
2. As shown in equation (4), each firm produces
Qi using labor input Li.
7
Qi = Li. (4)
Solving each firm’s profit maximization problem, one can derive the following
markup equation.
  Pi = ——–Wi,   (5)
  − 1   
where Wi is the nominal wage.
2. Labor market
The unemployment rate u is defined by equation (6) as follows.
L
f − L u = max(—— —, u –), (6) 
L
f
where L is the aggregate labor input from each firm, and L
f is the labor force. We
assume here that since the labor market is imperfect, at least (u – × 100) percent of 
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7. In Japan, an amendment to the Labour Standards Act caused the number of scheduled working hours to fall
rapidly from the late 1980s through the early 1990s. According to the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare), however, the number of regular hours actually worked by full-time workers had
stopped declining by 1993. Therefore, we assume that reductions in scheduled working hours have no significant
impact on the analyses herein.the labor force L
f are unemployed. Accordingly, u – represents the lower bound of 
the unemployment rate.
8
a. The notional wage level
The nominal wage is derived as a solution of the following bargaining problem, where
the firm and employees bargain over the nominal wage level Wi
n with bargaining 
power a (0 ≤ a ≤ 1). 




a] = max  (————————) (Wi
n − ((1 − u)W
––
+ ucP –))
a ,  (7)
Wi
n Wi
n  Li 
where  Rf is the firm’s surplus given by subtracting the fixed costs of production
fP –Di(f is the fraction of fixed costs per unit of good) and total nominal wages paid
Wi
nLi from revenue PiDi. On the other hand, Rl is the employee’s surplus that is 
given by subtracting the employee’s reservation wage from nominal wage. In this
case, using the unemployment rate u as a weight, the reservation wage can be
expressed as a weighted average of the average wage for employees when employed
with another firm W ––(= n
−1 
n
i=1Wi) and the income received when not working cP –
(e.g., unemployment insurance benefits).
Solving this problem, and further assuming that real wages are smoothed with the
previous period based on the parameter z(0 ≤ z ≤ 1), and that the bargaining is 
subject to individual shocks  i, one can derive the notional wage Wi
* divided by the
aggregate price level as follows.
Wi
* Wi,−1 — — = (1 − z)(—— ) + z{a[(Pi − fP –)Di/P –Li] 
P – P –
−1
+ (1 − a)[(1 − u)(  − 1)/  + uc]} +  i, (8)
where the average real wage W ––/P – is expressed by (  − 1)/  from equation (5), and 
 i is given by the following equation, with the autocorrelation coefficient    and the
normally distributed disturbance  i
  with mean zero and variance   
2.
 i =    i,−1 +  i
 ,   i
  ∼N(0,   
2). (9)
Note that the notional wage Wi
* here is the result of this bargaining and inertia when
there is no DNWR.
9
Also, as in equations (10) and (11), we suppose that the notional wage Wi
*
determined in equation (8) consists of the notional regular wage Si
* with the weight
(1 −  *) and the notional bonus Bi
* with a weight  *.
10
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8. Once the unemployment rate reaches its lower bound, it becomes impossible to hire additional workers, such
that even if the money supply increases, only prices and nominal wages increase.
9. As explained later, since the notional wage is affected by labor market distortions, it is not necessarily the same as
the equilibrium wage level that clears labor supply and demand.
10. Although, in reality, the notional fraction of bonuses  * is determined endogenously, we take it as fixed for 
simplification. When wages are cut, however, the ex post fraction   obtained from the simulation declines during
a recession, reflecting that bonus cuts occur prior to regular wage cuts ( s >  b).Si
* = (1 −  *)Wi
*, (10)
Bi
* =  *Wi
*. (11)
This allows us to capture the wage structure in Japan wherein bonus payments can
serve as a tool for nominal wage adjustment.
b. DNWR
Based on the friction model estimated by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b), we introduce
the DNWR for both regular wages and bonuses as follows.
Si
* if Si,−1 < Si
*, 
Si = Si,−1 if  Si,−1e
− s < Si
* ≤ Si,−1, 
 Si
*e




* if Bi,−1 <Bi
*, 
Bi = Bi,−1 if  Bi,−1e
− b < Bi
* ≤ Bi,−1, 
 Bi
*e
 b if                 Bi
* < Bi,−1e
− b, (13)
where   s and   b are parameters that indicate the threshold values until which 
nominal wages are not cut even if the notional wage changes are negative. Likewise,
 s and  b are parameters that indicate the divergence of the nominal wage changes
from the notional wage ones when nominal wage cuts do occur. Equations (12) 
and (13) indicate that DNWR is present when the notional wage change is between
−(  × 100) and zero percent, and the observed nominal wage cut is the notional
wage change plus an additional change of (  × 100) percent when the notional wage
change is below −(  × 100) percent. The observed nominal wage Wi is the total of
the observed regular wage Si and observed bonus Bi, as shown below.
Wi = Si + Bi, (14)
As pointed out by Fehr and Götte (2000), we may not preclude the possibility
that the threshold values ( s and  b) become smaller as the inflation rate becomes
very low, causing DNWR to disappear. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b), however,
did not find any changes in the threshold value attributable to the inflation rate in
the estimated friction model for the regular wages and annual earnings of full-time
male employees.
11 We therefore assume that the threshold values do not change with
respect to either the inflation rate or time. 
c. Labor market distortion other than DNWR
It is important to recognize that both the ADP and our models include the
upward distortions to real and nominal notional wages caused by the employee’s
bargaining power a, the real value of the worker’s time while unemployed c, and
the inertia of real wages (1 − z) in equation (8). That is, when the parameters in
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11. This finding of Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) is limited to a narrow band of inflation rates from –1.17 to 
2.19 percent, so the possibility of a change in the threshold value cannot be excluded when the inflation rate
exceeds these bounds.equation (8) have values 0 < a ≤ 1, 0 < c, and 0 < z ≤ 1, real and nominal
notional wages are higher than the equilibrium level that clears excess supply and
demand in the labor market (a = 0, c = 0, z = 1). We call these distortions labor
market distortions. 
As will be explained later, labor market distortions cause unemployment by
increasing notional real and nominal wages above the market clearing level. We there-
fore distinguish the unemployment generated in this way from the unemployment
caused by DNWR.
3. The relationship between DNWR and the rates of inflation and 
unemployment
The relationship between nominal wages and the money supply, inflation rate, and
unemployment rate in the model can be explained as follows. Note that since 
aggregate demand is exogenously given and the money supply is a proxy variable 
for aggregate demand in our model, lowering the money supply corresponds to 
insufficient labor demand caused by a decline in effective demand.
a. A case without labor market distortions
To start with, we assume a case without labor market distortions (a = 0, c = 0, z = 1).
Suppose that nominal wages are perfectly flexible and the actual nominal wage and
the notional wage in equations (12) and (13) are always equal (i.e., Si = Si
* and 
Bi = Bi
* regardless of the change in notional wages). Then, a   percent change in the
money supply M results in a   percent change in prices, since nominal wages fully
respond to the change in the money supply without affecting the unemployment
rate. This means that, in a world of flexible nominal wages, the unemployment rate is
independent of the rate of inflation. In other words, there is no correlation between
the unemployment rate and the inflation rate.
On the other hand, assuming the existence of DNWR as in equations (12) and
(13), we can see that the unemployment rate differs according to the rate of inflation.
When the growth rate of the money supply M declines, aggregate demand declines in
accordance with equation (2). In this case, it is necessary to lower the nominal wage
down to the level of the notional wage level Wi
* to keep the unemployment rate from
increasing. Given that nominal wages are downwardly rigid in equations (12) and (13),
however, even when the notional wage drops below the level of the previous period
(Wi,−1 >Wi
*), the nominal wage must be left unchanged. Firms facing those conditions
have to pay out nominal wages higher than the notional level that would exist without
downward rigidity (Wi > Wi
*). Then, in accordance with markup equation (5), the
firm’s product price Pi is also set higher than the level determined by the notional wage
Wi
*. As a result, demand for that firm’s product decreases in accordance with equation
(2) and thus its labor input Li must also decrease. If firms faced with DNWR continue
to adjust their labor costs by reducing labor input instead of lowering nominal wages,
the unemployment rate winds up increasing. 
In the opposite scenario whereby the rate of growth in the money supply M
increases, the inflation rate goes up, and product demand increases, there will be an
overall increase in the notional wage of each firm. Under such a situation, a smaller
number of firms will be bound by the constraint from DNWR in equations (12) and
(13), and thus the unemployment rate can be kept low.
66 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 2003Therefore, in an economy where DNWR exists and cannot be eliminated for 
an extended period, the unemployment rate and the inflation rate are negatively 
correlated.
12
b. A case with labor market distortions
Next we consider the case when the labor market distortions in equation (8) (0 < a
≤ 1, 0 < z ≤ 1, and 0 < c) are present. In this case, there is a negative correlation
between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate, even when no DNWR exists.
In other words, due to workers’ bargaining power, real unemployment income, and
wage inertia, the notional wage Wi
* is stuck higher than the labor market clearing
level Wi
**. Since the notional wage Wi
* is determined by equation (8) in a way such
that it exceeds the labor market clearing level Wi
** by a fixed value rather than a fixed
proportion, labor market distortions are non-neutral to the nominal price level. 
For example, the greater the decline in the labor market clearing wage Wi
** due to
deflation, the larger in relative terms becomes the notional wage’s deviation from 
the labor market clearing level due to labor market distortion, and this increases
unemployment. Furthermore, since there is inertia in the notional wage Wi
*, during
deflationary periods, the notional wage is pulled upward by the nominal wage level of
the previous period. Therefore, the greater the extent of deflation, the more the
unemployment rate rises.
13,14
It is important to note that the negative correlation between the unemployment
rate and the inflation rate becomes even greater when the labor market distortions
from equation (8) are present in addition to DNWR given by equations (12) and
(13). For this reason, we distinguish between the unemployment caused by the labor
market distortions in equation (8) and that caused by the DNWR in equations (12)
and (13).
To see why there is a negative correlation between unemployment and inflation
even in the absence of DNWR, we derive the labor input L
e from our model with a
representative firm, perfectly flexible nominal wages, and no shocks to demand for
goods or to real wages. This gives the following equation.
 M−1 L
e = ———————————————————————————— –,
   z(1−a)(1 − —— –c) M −1 + ——–P−1{(1 − a)c + a(1 − f ) + (1 − z)W−1}
  − 1                  − 1  
(15)
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12. It has long been pointed out that when there is DNWR, there exists a negative correlation between the
unemployment rate and the inflation rate even over the long run. For example, Tobin (1972) mentions that
the long-run Phillips curve becomes horizontal in regions of high unemployment when there is DNWR,
arguing against the claim of Friedman and others that the Phillips curve becomes vertical at the natural
unemployment rate.
13. Since our simulation derives the steady-state rate of unemployment under the conditions in which prices increase
or decrease at a constant rate, the inertia of wages can have an impact on not only the adjustment process but also
on the steady state point itself.
14. Graham and Snower (2003) derive a long-run negative correlation between the inflation rate and the unem-
ployment rate without assuming DNWR, by incorporating staggered wage adjustments in the new Keynesian
macro model.where the inflation rate   enters the model exogenously as M =  M−1. Taking the
derivative of labor input with respect to the inflation rate yields
  —— –P−1{(1 − a)c +a(1 − f ) + (1 − z)W−1}M−1
 L
e   − 1  —– = ——————————————————————————— — >0. 
       
2
z(1−a)(1− —— –c) M−1+ —— –P−1{(1−a)c +a(1−f ) + (1− z)W−1}  
   − 1                  − 1                                                        
(16) 
This shows that higher (lower) rates of inflation lead to increases (decreases) in labor
input. Note that without labor market distortions (a = 0, c = 0, z = 1), the partial
derivative in equation (16) becomes  L
e/   = 0, and thus changes in the inflation
rate do not cause changes in labor input.
15
c. Comparisons with the standard Phillips curve
The relationship between the inflation rate and the unemployment rate in our model
is not comparable to that derived by the standard Friedman-Phelps-type Phillips
curve, since the underlying mechanisms are different.
In the standard Phillips curve, when changes in the money supply occur, a negative
correlation is observed between inflation and unemployment for a temporary period.
However, after prices and wages have completely absorbed the shock caused by changes
in money supply, the unemployment rate returns to its original level (equivalent to 
the natural rate of unemployment or the NAIRU), which we often call the long-run
(vertical) Phillips curve. Additionally, it is usual to assume that even if there are labor
market distortions, those distortions are neutral relative to the nominal price level.
Consequently, the amount of unemployment caused by labor market distortions is
independent of the rate of inflation.
In contrast, our analysis is based on the assumption that neither DNWR nor
labor market distortions disappear over the long run, and that those labor market 
distortions are non-neutral to nominal price levels. Therefore, our simulation aims to
calculate the steady-state rate of unemployment under the condition that Japan’s
labor market structure, including DNWR and labor market distortions, is not
changed permanently. Note that in this case the simulated unemployment rate is not
uniquely determined for each inflation rate. Therefore, our model simulates a steady-
state rate of unemployment for a given level of inflation rate. From here on, we will
refer to this simulated unemployment rate as “the steady-state unemployment rate.”
C. Simulation Procedure
A brief explanation of the simulation procedure we use for our model is given below.
1. Setting target values
First, to ensure that our model consistently replicates Japan’s labor market, we simulate
the model to hit the target values derived from actual data. We use four targets as in
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15. In Akerlof et al. (1996), the unemployment brought about by the labor market distortions is not explicitly 
distinguished from the unemployment due to DNWR. As shown in the simulation results in Section IV, 
however, when we apply the simulation to Japan’s labor market, the unemployment due to the labor market 
distortions becomes crucial under low inflation and deflation.Akerlof et al. (1996): the standard deviation of nominal wage changes, the rate of job
creation, the rate of job destruction, and the steady-state unemployment rate.
We set a target value of 5 percent for the standard deviation of nominal wage
changes, based on the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare).
16 Our target values for the job creation rate and the job destruction
rate
17 are 8 percent for each, based on the estimates from Higuchi and Shinpo (1998)
and Genda (1998).
18 The steady-state unemployment rate target value is 3.01 percent
when the inflation rate is 2 percent (its value in 1985). This value is estimated by
using flow data on employment and unemployment.
19
2. Setting the parameters
Our model contains 16 parameters. For the number of firms n, we use 10,000.
20 The
model’s exogenously assigned lower bound on the unemployment rate u – is assumed
as 2.65 percent, which is approximately 90 percent of the steady-state unemployment
rate in 1985.
21 For the parameters related to DNWR, we adopt the estimates from
Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) noted in Section II,  s = 0.077 and  s = –0.029 for
regular wages and  b = 0.035 and  b = –0.027 for bonuses.
22 For the relative shares of
notional regular wages and bonuses, we compute the fraction of total cash wages
accounted for by annual bonuses for male employees in 1985, which corresponds to
 * = 0.31.
23
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16. We use the weighted standard deviation of the year-on-year change in total annual earnings for males, broken down
by industry, company size, age group, and education level. The weights are the number of workers in each category.
17. The job creation rate  
c and the job destruction rate  
d are defined as follows.
Li −Li,−1 Li −Li,−1  
c = i∈{Li−Li ,−1>0}(——— – × 100),     
d =− i∈{Li−Li,−1<0}(——— – × 100).   
Li,−1 Li,−1
18. Higuchi and Shinpo (1998) estimate the job creation rate and the job destruction rate as 7.4 percent and 
7.9 percent. This estimate, however, does not include firms with less than five employees. Genda (1998) finds
that in firms with less than five employees, the job creation and job destruction rates are both higher than in
larger firms. Based on this finding, we use a rate of 8 percent, a slightly higher figure than the estimates from
Higuchi and Shinpo (1998).
19. We compute the transition matrix for males with two states—employed and unemployed, from the Ministry of
Labour (2000 and other years). We then estimate the steady-state unemployment rate for males, by assuming this
transition matrix to be an ergodic Markov one. The estimated steady-state unemployment rate is 3.01 percent in
1985, 2.08 percent in 1990, 3.41 percent in 1995, 5.74 percent in 1999, and 5.91 percent in 2000. For the
details of computations for the steady-state unemployment rate using flow data, see Kuhn and Schuetze (2001)
and Kuroda (2003). 
20. We set the number of firms by referencing the sample sizes in frequently cited surveys of Japanese firms (includ-
ing the Business and Investment Survey of Incorporated Enterprises [Cabinet Office], Quarterly Survey of Japanese
Business Activities [Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry], and the Tankan Short-Term Economic Survey of
Enterprises in Japan [Bank of Japan]). The number of firms does not alter the simulation results to a great extent.
21. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2001) reports that the frictional and structural unemployment rate
is 2.26 percent in the first quarter of 1985, which amounts to 88 percent of the official unemployment rate at
that time. For our model, we set 2.65 percent as the lower bound of the unemployment rate, by applying this 
88 percent factor to the steady-state unemployment rate for 1985.
22. The bonus parameters are set under the assumption that bonuses will be cut prior to regular wages if wages are going
to be cut, and thus we use the parameter for downward rigidity of annual earnings estimated by Kuroda and
Yamamoto (2003b). It should be noted that the data used for estimation by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) include
overtime pay in annual earnings. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the less downward rigidity of annual
earnings than regular wages is reflecting the adjustments through overtime pay as well as bonuses.
23. Under periods of high inflation when DNWR is unlikely to bind, we believe that the observed fraction of
bonuses approaches the notional one. This is why we use the value from 1985.For the parameters regarding labor market distortion, we use a = 0.10, c = 0.30,
and z = 0.80, consistent with Akerlof et al. (1996). To do sensitivity analysis, we also
check both lower (a = 0.05, c = 0.25, z = 0.90) and higher (a = 0.15, c = 0.35, 
z = 0.70) levels of labor market distortion.
For the other parameters, we check possible combinations of the parameters
within the ranges below, following Akerlof et al. (1996):   = [4.0, 6.0],    = [0.1,
0.9],    = [0.1, 0.9],    = [0.01, 0.10],    = [0.01, 0.10], f = [0.0, 0.25]. We then




In choosing the parameters, we first set the inflation rate
26 at 2 percent and then
choose the parameter combinations that achieve the mean squared errors from the
four target values that fall within given ranges for each. Next, we simulate the steady-
state unemployment rates with zero inflation, using every possible combination of
those parameters, and then choose the parameter combination that gives the median
value steady-state unemployment rate. Armed with the parameters chosen in this
way, we simulate the steady-state unemployment rates corresponding to other infla-
tion rates, and use these results as our baseline. For each simulation, the number of
repetition is 300.
27
Unlike Akerlof et al. (1996), our analysis focuses on how the steady-state unem-
ployment rate changes in response to changes in the extent of DNWR. That is,
Akerlof et al. (1996) look at how the steady-state unemployment rate increases 
from pushing the inflation rate below 3 percent. In contrast, we look at how the
steady-state unemployment rate changes depending on the parameters that describe
the extent of DNWR. We believe the larger (smaller) the threshold values ( s and  b)
in equations (12) and (13), the greater (smaller) the number of firms affected by
DNWR and the higher (lower) the steady-state unemployment rate.
To see this, we change the parameters for DNWR ( s and  b), as well as the 
inflation rate, to simulate the steady-state unemployment rate that corresponds to
each set of values.
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24. For the price elasticity of product demand, we set a range of parameter values from   = 5.16, which is computed









(  − 1)/  in our model (D is the aggregated product demand for each monopolistically competitive firm, where
D = L in equilibrium), it is possible to compute   once we know labor share. We compute the labor share with
data from Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry (Ministry of Finance) in the 1980s and 1990s.
25. Within the given ranges, we set the parameters in each 0.25 interval for  , 0.1 for    and   , 0.05 for f , and
0.001 for    and   .
26. In our simulation, we assume that the inflation rate would change as much as the exogenous rate of change in the
money supply M. However, when the rate of change in the money supply M is lowered, the aggregate price level
moves higher relative to the case with no downward rigidity, since firms that defer nominal wage cuts also defer
changes in their product price using the markup formula. As a result, strictly speaking, the inflation rate is 
not going to be exactly the same as the rate of change in money supply M. Looking at the simulation results,
however, the inflation rate is virtually unaffected by firms constrained by DNWR, and thus it is nearly the same
as the rate of change in money supply M. For this reason, our model treats the inflation rate as being the same as
the change in the money supply.
27. In each simulation, we generate the individual shocks (vi
  and vi
 ) from a normal distribution, and then iteratively
calculate the value of each variable.IV. Simulation Results 
A. The Impact of DNWR on the Steady-State Unemployment Rate
The parameters chosen through the process explained in the previous section are 
as follows:  s = 0.077,  s =− 0.029,  b = 0.035,  b =− 0.027,   = 4.75,   = 0.31, 
c = 0.30,    = 0.10,    = 0.60,    = 0.013,    = 0.035, z = 0.80, a = 0.10, and 
f = 0.15.
The simulation result is shown in Figure 2. The thick solid line with black squares
shows the relationship between the inflation rate and the simulated steady-state
unemployment rate. Hereafter, we refer to this baseline result as case A. Based on
these parameters, inflation of 2 percent produces a steady-state unemployment rate 
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[  s =   s =   b =   b = 0]      
A. Baseline
[   s = 0.077,   s = –0.029,






[  s = 1,000,   b = 1,000]   
Notes: 1. Simulation results of general equilibrium model with DNWR.
2. The baseline parameters for  s and  b are from the estimates of friction 
models in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) for the regular wages and annual
earnings of full-time male employees.
3. Due to the existence of DNWR, the steady-state unemployment rate is not
uniquely determined but rather variant with the inflation rate. Therefore, 
each plot represents the steady-state unemployment rate simulated under
the corresponding inflation rate.
4. Since our model assumes the lower bound of the steady-state unemployment
rate at 2.65 percent, the relationship between the steady-state unemployment
rate and the inflation rate becomes vertical at that point.of 3.12 percent. This corresponds to point i in Figure 2. Likewise, with 1 percent
inflation, the steady-state unemployment rate is 4.60 percent, and with zero percent
inflation it is 5.95 percent, plotted in Figure 2 as points ii and iii, respectively. Since
we set a floor on the steady-state unemployment rate, the relationship between 
the inflation rate and the steady-state unemployment rate becomes vertical at 2.65
percent. It is also important to note that at an inflation rate of zero percent, the range
within one standard deviation of the simulated steady-state unemployment rate
under different parameter combinations is 5.58 to 6.33 percent. Thus, changing the
parameter combinations does not change to a substantial degree the steady-state
unemployment rate.
28
Next, we simulate the effect of the changes in the extent of DNWR ( s and  b)
on the steady-state unemployment rate. The solid line with empty squares in Figure 2
shows the relationship between inflation and the simulated steady-state unemploy-
ment rate when we set the extent of downward rigidities at extremely large values 
for  s and  b ( s = 1,000 and  b = 1,000). We call this result case B (the perfect
downward rigidity model).
29 We can see that under perfect DNWR, the steady-state
unemployment rates are considerably higher than in case A. In other words, the
extent of DNWR for full-time male employees represented by  s = 0.077 and  b =
0.035 has less of an impact on the steady-state unemployment rate compared with
the case of perfect downward rigidity.
We look next at the opposite case, when there is no DNWR. We plot case C (the
no downward rigidity model), which assumes complete flexibility in nominal wages
and sets  s =  s =  b =  b = 0, as the solid line with empty triangles in Figure 2.
It should be noted in case C that the steady-state unemployment rate departs
from its lower bound of 2.65 percent and incrementally increases, despite the 
complete lack of DNWR. This shows, as explained in the previous section, how the
labor market distortions in equation (8) push up the steady-state unemployment rate
as the inflation rate declines. Under case C, the steady-state unemployment rate is
not affected by DNWR. Therefore, the gap between the steady-state unemployment
rate under case C and the steady-state unemployment rate under baseline case A 
represents the net increase in the steady-state unemployment rate due to DNWR.
This comparison of cases A and C shows that the steady-state unemployment rate
tends to be held down to a maximum of 1.8 percentage points when there is no
DNWR. In other words, if the degree of DNWR were considerably lower than that
measured by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b), the steady-state unemployment rate
should also have been lower by approximately 1.8 percentage points. For the rest of
the paper, we will refer to the steady-state unemployment rate attributable purely to
DNWR as “the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR.”
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28. Although we assume in our model a notional fraction of the bonus relative to regular wage   of 0.31, changing
this parameter value does not change the steady-state unemployment rate to a great extent.
29. When there is perfect DNWR, the lower the rate of change in M, the greater the number of firms constrained by
downward rigidity; therefore the divergence between the rate of change in M and the inflation rate becomes
large. Accordingly, it is important to note that under the perfect DNWR of case B, actual results should plot
higher and to the right.Figure 3 plots the difference between the steady-state unemployment rates under
cases A and C to focus on how the steady-state unemployment rate induced by
DNWR increases as the inflation rate declines (case A-d). The figure indicates that
when the inflation rate is above 2.4 percent, even in the presence of DNWR, the
steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR does not increase at all.
30
Next, when the inflation rate drops below 2.4 percent, the effects of DNWR
come into play and the steady-state unemployment rate gradually increases. For
example, when the inflation rate declines from 2 to 1 percent, the steady-state unem-
ployment rate induced by DNWR moves from 0.47 to 1.77 percent, an increase of
1.30 percentage points.
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Note: Simulation results of general equilibrium model with DNWR.
30. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the lower bound on the inflation rate (2.4 percent), required to ensure that
the steady-state unemployment rate is unaffected by DNWR, depends on the target inflation rate and the lower
bound on the steady-state unemployment rate. For our simulation, we have chosen parameters that give a steady-
state unemployment rate of 3.01 percent when inflation is at 2 percent and we do not allow the steady-state
unemployment rate to drop below 2.65 percent. For this reason, the gap between cases A and C gradually disap-
pears as the inflation rate moves above 2 percent and the two cases yield the same results when the inflation rate
reaches 2.4 percent. However, if the target rate of inflation is set higher or the lower bound on the steady-state
unemployment rate is set lower, the rate of inflation at which cases A and C are equalized moves higher.
Accordingly, the lower bound on the inflation rate required to ensure that DNWR has no effect can vary
depending on how these values are set.Further declines in the inflation rate below 1 percent, however, have almost no
effect on the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR. For example, a
decrease in the inflation rate from 1 to –1 percent only increases the steady-state
unemployment rate induced by DNWR by 0.1 percentage point.
Finally, it may be interesting to note that when the inflation rate further declines
below –1 percent, the steady-state unemployment rate induced by downward rigidity
begins to decline and reaches zero when the inflation rate drops to approximately 
–6 percent.
31
B. The Impact of DNWR on the Steady-State Unemployment Rate 
under Low Inflation or Deflation
Our finding that declines in the inflation rate below 1 percent have almost no upward
impact on the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR is not necessarily
consistent with Akerlof et al. (1996). Recall that Akerlof et al. (1996) argue that 
dropping the inflation rate from 3 to zero percent increases the steady-state unem-
ployment rate in the United States from 5.9 to 7.6 percent, and 1 percent deflation
raises the unemployment rate to as high as 10 percent because of the existence of
DNWR. Hence, it is interesting to investigate the possible explanations of why there
is so little upward impact on the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR
with inflation below 1 percent in our simulation, which is geared toward Japan’s 
labor market. To answer that question, we will engage in further simulations by 
changing the parameters describing DNWR.
1. The effects of bonuses
As explained in Section III.A, our model differs from the ADP model in that it
includes bonuses. Hence, we now look at how the presence of bonuses affects the
steady-state unemployment rate.
Case D (no bonus) shown in Figure 4 alters the baseline case A in Figure 2 by 
setting parameter  * to zero and assuming no bonus, i.e., all of the nominal wages are
paid out as regular wages. Accordingly, a comparison of the steady-state unemploy-
ment rate between case D (no bonus) and case A makes it possible to identify the
degree to which the bonus payment weakens DNWR and to which unemployment
could be avoided as a result.
Figure 4 shows that the steady-state unemployment rate in case D (no bonus) is
higher by 0.94 percentage point with 1 percent inflation and by 1.25 percentage points
with 1 percent deflation than in the baseline case A. Therefore, the simulation results
can be interpreted as showing that bonus payments have lowered the steady-state
unemployment rate by approximately 1 percentage point. 
To examine more closely how the presence of bonuses affects the steady-state 
unemployment rate induced by DNWR, we plot the difference between case D and
case C as case D-d in Figure 5. Case A-d (baseline) includes the bonus, which is the
same as in Figure 3. As noted earlier, in case A-d, reducing the inflation rate below 
1 percent has almost no effect on the steady-state unemployment rate induced by
DNWR, meaning that under low inflation or deflation, the curve is nearly vertical.
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31. We believe this is because the change in notional wages on average drops below the threshold level under extreme
deflation, and thus the constraints from DNWR effectively disappear.75
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However, in case D-d when there is no bonus, the curve is slightly downward
sloping even if the inflation rate is below 1 percent. For example, lowering the infla-
tion rate from 1 to –1 percent causes an additional 0.4 percentage point increase in
the steady-state unemployment rate induced by downward rigidity. It follows from
this result that when inflation is low or negative, bonuses serve to suppress, albeit
only slightly, increases in the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR.
2. Changes in the steady-state unemployment rate due to  
As explained in Section II, the results of Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) show that,
although nominal wages in Japan do have some degree of downward rigidity, once a
certain threshold is exceeded, the nominal wage tends to be cut considerably more
than does the notional wage. This is another difference between our model and the
ADP model, represented in our model by a negative value of  .
Figure 4  Relationship between the Inflation Rate and the Steady-State
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F. International comparison
  Altonji and Devereux (1999):   s =   b = 0.654,   s =   b = 0.044 







Notes: 1. Simulation results of general equilibrium model with DNWR.
2. The baseline parameters for  s and  b are from the estimates of friction 
models in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) for the regular wages and annual
earnings of full-time male employees.
3. Due to the existence of DNWR, the steady-state unemployment rate is not
uniquely determined but rather variant with the inflation rate. Therefore, 
each plot represents the steady-state unemployment rate simulated under 
the corresponding inflation rate.
4. Since our model assumes the lower bound of the steady-state unemployment
rate at 2.65 percent, the relationship between the steady-state unemployment
rate and the inflation rate becomes vertical at that point.To see the effect of  , Figure 4 also shows the simulation results when  s is set to
zero with no bonus, which we designate as case E (no bonus and  s = 0). Comparing
case E with case D (no bonus), the steady-state unemployment rate is higher in case 
E by approximately 0.5 percentage point with a 1 percent inflation rate and by 
1.25 percentage points with 1 percent deflation. Compared with the baseline case A, 
it is higher by approximately 1.5 percentage points with a 1 percent inflation rate and
3.57 percentage points with 1 percent deflation. That is, the presence of bonuses and
the  s parameter weakens the degree of downward rigidity in the nominal wages of 
full-time male employees in Japan, and thereby suppresses growth in the steady-state
unemployment rate by approximately 1.50 to 3.57 percentage points.
Furthermore, under case E (no bonus and  s = 0), the larger the decline in the
inflation rate, the greater tends to be the difference in the steady-state unemployment
rate with case C. For example, looking at the difference between case E and case C,
plotted as case E-d (no bonus and  s = 0) in Figure 5, the curve is slightly downward
sloping even with inflation below 1 percent. In other words, with no bonus and 
 s = 0, when the inflation rate declines, the steady-state unemployment rate induced
by DNWR tends to continue rising. This tendency is not observed in baseline case
A-d, and somewhat observable in case D-d (no bonus). In case E-d (no bonus and 
 s = 0), when inflation declines from 1 to –1 percent, the steady-state unemployment
rate induced by DNWR increases by an additional 1.1 percentage points. Taking
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Figure 5  Impact of DNWR on the Steady-State Unemployment Rate: The Effects of
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Steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR, percent
Note: Simulation results of general equilibrium model with DNWR.into account that the additional increase in the steady-state unemployment rate from
not having a bonus is approximately 0.4 percentage point, this indicates that setting
 s to zero has a net impact of approximately 0.7 percentage point.
To summarize the results from Section IV.B.1 and B.2, it is possible to conclude 
that although DNWR is present to some extent, the increase in the steady-state
unemployment rate induced by DNWR is constrained in Japan under low inflation
or deflation. This feature is brought about mainly by nominal wage adjustments
through bonuses and wage cuts, when they do occur, being larger than those indicated
by the decline in the notional wage.
C. International Comparisons
Next, we simulate our model by assuming that the extent of DNWR is the same as
that estimated for other countries in prior research. Specifically, we use the estimation
results of Altonji and Devereux (1999) and Fehr and Götte (2000), which estimate a
friction model as in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) by using longitudinal data from
the United States and Switzerland, respectively. The DNWR parameters they found
are  s =  b = 0.654 and  s =  b = 0.044 for the United States, and  s =  b = 0.312
and  s =  b = –0.078 for Switzerland. The simulation results using these parameters
are shown in Figure 4 as case F (international comparison).
Case F plots out as a single line because of the overlap in results obtained 
from applying the U.S. and Swiss parameters. Moreover, the simulated steady-state
unemployment rate in case F also overlaps with case B, which is the case of perfect 
downward rigidity. Therefore, one may interpret these findings as showing that the
impact of DNWR on the steady-state unemployment rate is extremely small in Japan
compared with countries such as the United States and Switzerland, where there is
nearly perfect DNWR.
D. The Impact of Labor Market Distortions on the Steady-State Unemployment
Rate: Robustness Check
It is important to see how the parameters of labor market distortion (a = 0.10, 
c = 0.30, z = 0.80) in equation (8) change the results, since the simulated steady-state
unemployment rate in our model is affected not only by nominal wage rigidity 
but also by other labor market distortions. We therefore check the robustness of our
simulation results by changing the parameters in equation (8) that describe labor
market distortions. We use two sets of parameters: one indicating a small presence of
labor market distortions (a = 0.05, c = 0.25, z = 0.90) and the other indicating a large
presence (a = 0.15, c = 0.35, z = 0.70). The simulation results are summarized in
Figure 6 [1] for small labor market distortions and in Figure 6 [2] for large labor
market distortions.
Looking first at the case of small labor market distortions in Figure 6 [1], it is clear
that the steady-state unemployment rates generated by the model, cases A′ (baseline),
B′ (perfect DNWR), and C′ (no DNWR), are smaller than the standard cases in 
Figure 2. In contrast, the cases of large labor market distortions in Figure 6 [2], cases
A″(baseline), B″(perfect DNWR), and C″(no DNWR), generate a higher steady-state
unemployment rates than the standard cases in Figure 2.
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Figure 6  Relationship between the Inflation Rate and the Steady-State
Unemployment Rate: Robustness Checks
[1] When Labor Market Distortions Are Small
Note: With parameters set at a = 0.15, c = 0.35, z = 0.70 (in Figures 2–5,


































Note: With parameters set at a = 0.05, c = 0.25, z = 0.90 (in Figures 2–5,
parameters are set at a = 0.10, c = 0.30, z = 0.80).79
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Next, in Figure 7, we plot the difference between the baseline (cases A, A′, and
A″) and the no DNWR model (cases C, C′, and C″) to see the relationship between
the inflation rate and the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR. 
The comparison shows that the labor market distortions also have an effect on 
the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR. For example, when the
inflation rate is 1 percent, the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR 
is less than 1.5 percent with the small labor market distortions, but approximately
2.5 percent with the large labor market distortions.
In addition, when focusing on how much the steady-state unemployment rate
induced by DNWR would increase from lowering the inflation rate, we see that
every line is nearly vertical with the inflation rate under 1 percent. This implies that
the choice of parameters describing labor market distortions does not seem to affect
the tendency of the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR to not
increase very much under low inflation. 
It is also possible to take these robustness checks as indicative of the degree to
which the steady-state unemployment rate would change under structural changes—
specifically changes to the real value of workers’ time while unemployed such as
unemployment insurance benefits (parameter c) and the workers’ bargaining power
(parameter a). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that when evaluating
policies that promote such structural changes, we should account not only for
changes in the steady-state unemployment rate, but also for changes in social welfare
brought about by the policy change. That is, even if lowering unemployment benefits
Figure 7  Impact of DNWR on the Steady-State Unemployment Rate: Robustness
Checks
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Note: Simulation results of general equilibrium model with DNWR.(lowering parameter c) causes a reduction in the steady-state unemployment rate, it
may not be the case that this policy change improves social welfare, since the utility
level of unemployment declines. Additionally, when evaluating policies from a 
welfare perspective, we should account for the fact that the source of funds for 
unemployment benefits is not explicitly built into our model.
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V. Concluding Remarks: Policy Implications and Remarks
A. Summary and Policy Implications
This paper examines the impact of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) on 
the unemployment rate. Under low inflation or deflation, when nominal wages are 
not fully adjusted due to downward rigidity, firms may make quantitative adjustments
to their labor input, and this may cause an increase in the aggregate unemployment
rate. By running a simulation using a general equilibrium model with DNWR, we 
estimate the impact of downward rigidity on the steady-state unemployment rate for
male employees.
Our model represents the extent of DNWR as the range where required nominal
wage cuts are deferred. By changing this range in various ways, we compare 
how the simulated steady-state unemployment rates differ. The levels of DNWR 
we try include (1) the baseline case from estimates by Kuroda and Yamamoto 
(2003b) using Japanese longitudinal data; (2) under perfect DNWR; (3) when no
DNWR is present; (4) when there is a greater degree of DNWR due to the 
lack of bonuses; (5) when the extent of actual nominal wage cuts is less than 
under the baseline case; and (6) using the estimates from other countries in 
prior research. 
The simulation results indicate that the impact of DNWR for full-time male
employees in Japan in the 1990s estimated by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) is
considerably less than in the case of perfect DNWR. This impact is not trivial, 
however, and under the baseline parameters assumed for our model, it increases the
steady-state unemployment rate by as much as approximately 1.8 percentage points.
Looking next at how this impact changes in accordance with the inflation rate, we
find the following. First, when the inflation rate is approximately 2.4 percent or
higher, there is no increase in the steady-state unemployment rate. Second, as the
inflation rate drops below 2.4 percent, the steady-state unemployment rate gradually
increases. Third, under low inflation of less than approximately 1 percent or 
deflation, the increase in the steady-state unemployment rate caused by DNWR 
disappears, and additional unemployment no longer occurs. This can be attributed to
the wage structure of Japan, which is characterized by nominal wage adjustments
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32. Regarding the desirable level of unemployment insurance benefits, there is a wealth of prior research analyzing
the level of benefits that optimizes social welfare using a general equilibrium model, including Hansen and
Imrohoroglu (1992) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). This prior research takes a comprehensive accounting of
the effect of raising unemployment insurance benefits on consumption smoothing, the impacts of the employees’
moral hazard on unemployment, and the distortionary effects on workers’ consumption brought by the tax
increases needed to finance the increase in benefits.through bonuses and greater cuts in nominal wages. Fourth, when the inflation rate
becomes substantially negative and reaches approximately –6 percent, the steady-state
unemployment rate attributable to DNWR disappears.
The result that serious increases in the steady-state unemployment rate are
avoided through bonuses and wage cuts signifies a certain degree of flexibility in
Japan’s labor market. In other words, when considering monetary policy in a defla-
tionary environment, even if the central bank is successful in raising the inflation rate
to approximately 1 percent as a way to reduce unemployment, it is unlikely that the
unemployment resulting from DNWR will disappear. Therefore, under low inflation
or mild deflation, there is little that monetary policy can contribute toward the
reduction of unemployment induced by DNWR. 
On the other hand, our simulation results indicate that DNWR has no effect 
on the steady-state unemployment rate when the rate of inflation is approximately
2.4 percent or higher. Considering this, one may conclude that the central bank
should target an inflation rate of at least 2.4 percent.
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In addition, our simulation shows that even the steady-state unemployment 
rate induced by labor market distortions apart from DNWR becomes higher as 
the inflation rate drops below 1 percent. Accordingly, given these labor market 
distortions, if monetary policy should aim to reduce the steady-state unemployment
rate caused by them, it makes sense to pursue a monetary policy that targets an 
inflation rate of 2.4 percent or higher. In this case, monetary policy may contribute
toward minimizing the damages brought about by distortions in the labor market
arising from structural factors.
However, one may insist that the rise in the unemployment rate induced by 
labor market distortions should be addressed through structural policies minimizing
the labor market distortions themselves, rather than through monetary policy. From
this standpoint, it may be important to make proposals that also address the optimal
arrangements to reduce unemployment such as unemployment insurance and other
labor market institutions.
B. Remarks
Given some limitations in our analysis such as the period of time covered and the
assumptions made, further analysis is required prior to concluding that monetary
policy should target a small but positive inflation rate. In the paragraphs that follow,
we offer some remarks on our model and suggestions for further analysis.
The first remark is the possibility that the parameter   has been getting
smaller during the last several years of persistent and mild deflation. As noted earlier,
Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) confirm that during the period 1993–98, the 
threshold value   indicating the extent of DNWR does not vary with the inflation
rate. Looking at changes in the inflation rate as measured by the consumer price
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33. Given that the steady-state unemployment rate induced by DNWR also disappears when the inflation rate drops
to approximately –6 percent, a mechanical interpretation of the results would suggest that setting the inflation
target at –6 percent would be another policy option. As explained below, however, it is important to keep in
mind that when considering the optimal rate of inflation, it is necessary to take a comprehensive look at the social
costs and benefits of inflation and deflation.index (CPI), however, the rate has remained negative since 1999. This points to the
possibility that the degree of DNWR has decreased following the period analyzed.
Kimura and Ueda (2001), who use time-series data by industry from the Basic
Survey on Wage Structure (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare), confirm the
existence of DNWR in Japan when using data until 1998. But they also report that
the DNWR disappears when extending the period of analysis until the first quarter
of 2000 using time-series data from the Monthly Labour Survey (Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare).
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Accordingly, an issue remaining for further research is whether the DNWR found
in Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003b) persists even during periods of sustained mild
deflation, as argued by Akerlof et al. (1996).
Our second remark concerns the settings used for our model. The general 
equilibrium model in this paper is useful for clarifying the impact of DNWR on the
unemployment rate and for debating the role monetary policy can play. As noted
above, however, our model does not account for different types of workers such as
full-time and part-time ones. As shown by Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, b), the
extent of DNWR varies greatly with the type of nominal wage. Consequently, to 
get a more accurate picture of DNWR’s impact on the unemployment rate, it is
preferable to expand the model by incorporating separate labor supply/demand 
functions for full-time and part-time workers and then consider the substitution 
relationship between workers’ types. Additionally, in our model, the only way firms
can adjust their labor costs is by changing either nominal wages or the labor 
input. In reality, however, firms are able to adjust labor costs through a variety of 
means, including by modifying the seniority wage system and retirement system,
eliminating annual wage accrual (teisho),
35 cutting nonwage benefits, conducting job
rotation within the firm (haiten), and temporarily transferring employees to other
firms (shukko). Considering these alternative ways to cut labor costs, the results of
our simulation might overestimate the impact of DNWR on unemployment.
Other remarks include (1) aggregate demand is given exogenously in our model,
and a decrease in aggregate demand indicates a decrease in the money supply; 
(2) changes in the money supply and in prices ultimately occur on nearly a one-
to-one basis; (3) the transmission of monetary policy is a black box and taken as
being insensitive to the inflation rate; (4) the model does not deal explicitly with 
two specific problems currently germane to Japan (the zero bound constraint on
nominal interest rates and the problem of nonperforming loans); and (5) there is 
no adjustment in the capital stock and no consideration of major supply-side 
structural changes.
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34. Caution is required in interpreting these results, given that the data used for the estimates through the first 
quarter of 2000 come from a different source than the analysis through 1998, and may also include workers with
different employment status. Kimura and Ueda (2001) point to a number of possible reasons why they find no
DNWR when they extend the estimation period to 2000. Those include the possibility that structural changes
through modifications of the seniority pay system reduced downward rigidity, as well as the possibility that a
large negative shock led to emergency cuts in nominal wages. 
35. By eliminating teisho, firms can reduce the total amounts of nominal wages if the workers’ composition within
the firm remains unchanged.Third, it is important to note that our model deals only with the impact of
DNWR on employment. DNWR can affect other aspects of the economy besides
unemployment, such as consumption and income. When deriving the implications
for monetary policy, it is necessary to take a broader view that encompasses aspects of
the economy outside of employment issues.
Fourth, it is important to realize that our analysis applies estimates from a short
period of longitudinal data into a general equilibrium model that abstracts from
many of the problems in Japan’s economy outside of DNWR. Consideration of the
optimal rate of inflation requires adequate treatment of numerous other factors
besides DNWR. Those factors include the presence of “shoe leather” costs, the 
non-neutrality of taxes with respect to inflation, the income transfer from debtors to
creditors and the effects of debt deflation on the financial system, and the possibility
that the zero bound constraint on nominal interest rates reduces the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. Additional research in this area is crucial to enable a proper
cost/benefit analysis of inflation and deflation aimed at identifying the optimal 
rate of inflation.
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